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COVID-19 and Regulating 
Vaccines
Dorit Reiss
Vaccine controversies are not new, but the COVID-19 pandemic has brought them to 
the forefront, and directed attention to the question of vaccine safety and regulation. 
This essay explores how vaccines are regulated, and how this applies to COVID-19 
vaccines. What I hope to demonstrate is that while no regulatory framework is perfect, 
we have a strong set of monitoring mechanisms available to oversee vaccine safety.
COVID-19, Vaccines, and COVID-19 
Vaccines
Our world is not as it was before 2020. 
COVID-19, a new and especially tricky 
virus, changed our reality—legally, eco-
nomically, and practically. Over the past 
year and some, more than three million 
people world-wide, and over half a mil-
lion people in the United States, died 
from COVID-19. Millions more were 
impacted, some by spending weeks in 
the hospital, some by suffering long-term 
harm, and some by suffering severe eco-
nomic consequences (and these catego-
ries, of course, overlap).
In response to the pandemic, public 
health authorities at the local and state 
level put in place an unprecedented pro-
gram of restrictions, including stay-at-
home orders and mask orders. A year 
later, not all restrictions have been lifted. 
The United States experienced several 
crises where states ran out of ICU capac-
ity. The economic and human effects of 
the pandemic are staggering. 
Our way out of the pandemic is multi-
faceted, but a large part of it is vaccines. 
Vaccines are among the most important 
medical advances in history, responsible 
for preventing extensive deaths, disabil-
ity, disease and economic harm. Vaccines 
are also extremely safe.1 But those vac-
cines have been developed over the 
course of years. In the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the first vaccines 
have been brought to market less than a 
year after the pandemic started. It is rea-
sonable to wonder whether the speed of 
development—combined with the inter-
ests of the pharmaceutical companies to 
seize the potential market provided by 
COVID-19—allowed sufficient over-
sight and whether the end result is as 
safe as routine vaccines.
This article addresses the process of 
creating vaccines. It then explains the 
system in place for monitoring them. 
Finally, it evaluates the effectiveness of 
this system in overseeing vaccine safety 
and identifying problems.
Creating Vaccines
Normally, the process of creating vac-
cines takes years. Before COVID-19 
vaccines, the fastest vaccine to be devel-
oped was the mumps vaccine, which took 
four years in the 1960s—before mod-
ern standards. Influenza vaccines are 
updated annually, but the only thing to 
be changed for them is the active ingredi-
ents—the strain of the virus—while their 
formula and the facilities to produce 
them remain the same. During a pan-
demic, waiting years means loss of life 
and extensive harm. We may still have 
had to do that, if the first vaccines had 
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not met safety and effectiveness mile-
stones. We got lucky: the first COVID-
19 vaccines exceeded expectations. 
The usual process for bringing a vac-
cine to market involves identifying the 
germ and identifying the target for a vac-
cine candidate, followed by preclinical 
studies in animals and three stages of 
trials in humans—increasing from a small 
number (tens) of healthy volunteers to 
large clinical trials of the target popula-
tion, consisting of thousands or tens of 
thousands.2 This process normally takes 
years. Most vaccines fail the first stage of 
clinical trials and never make it to market. 
This could have happened to COVID-
19 vaccines, but did not.
The rationale behind the process for 
vaccines—longer and more demanding 
than for most products—is that because 
vaccines are given to healthy individuals, 
to prevent a disease, they are held to 
a very high safety standard. Our toler-
ance for risk is lower for vaccines than 
for drugs given to address an existing 
condition. Although the pandemic con-
text complicates the analysis, because the 
risks of the pandemic are also immedi-
ate and glaring, we still are unlikely to 
accept vaccines that cause harm more 
than very rarely—as demonstrated in the 
case of the clots that may (or may not) 
be caused by the Johnson and Johnson 
(J&J) vaccines.
Although the speed of production may 
raise concerns about cutting corners, that 
is not what happened. We arrived at 
fast vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, the 
virus that causes COVID-19, thanks to 
three things, and some luck. The three 
important factors were previous devel-
opments in areas of research crucial for 
the creation of these specific vaccines; 
concentrated attention by many teams of 
talented scientists on the issue; and the 
infusion of large amounts of government 
money that allowed companies to take 
financial risks they could not otherwise 
take (without compromising safety). This 
discussion will focus on the mRNA vac-
cines produced by Pfizer-BioNtech and 
Moderna, because addressing all vac-
cines would take too long. In the discus-
sion of safety monitoring, I will use the 
Johnson and Johnson vaccine and blood 
clots to show the surveillance system at 
work.
The process began with a germ that 
was already known. Early on, through 
global surveillance, scientists identi-
fied SARS-CoV-2, a new coronavirus, 
as the culprit behind the new disease; 
and relatively soon, they narrowed in 
on the virus’s spike protein (a protein 
on the surface of the virus that allows 
it to go into cells) as the target for vac-
cines. Immediately, several companies 
began working on a variety of vaccine 
candidates.
This work benefited from two lines 
of research already in existence. Before, 
but especially since, the emergence of 
deadly outbreaks caused by other coro-
naviruses that target humans (the SARS 
outbreak in 2002–2003 and the MERS 
outbreak in 2012), teams of researchers 
have spent years or decades studying 
coronaviruses. Although SARS-CoV-2 
can and did surprise us in many ways, 
by the time of the pandemic there was a 
body of knowledge about coronaviruses, 
and a body of work that looked at creat-
ing vaccines against them, though no vac-
cines had yet been made.3 So the work on 
creating vaccines for the pandemic did 
not start from scratch; in fact, the focus 
on the spike protein was the result of 
previous work. Another line of previous 
work that helped was the development, 
over years, of RNA (ribonucleic acid) 
vaccines. These vaccines have not yet 
been market-ready, but they have been 
the focus of work of several scientists 
and companies over previous years.4 The 
vaccines themselves have initially gone 
through animal studies, though the first 
stage studies in human volunteers (with 
a small number of healthy volunteers) 
started before the end of the animal stud-
ies. However, the vaccines did not move 
forward to large clinical trials until strong 
data came out of both sets: animal stud-
ies, and first stage human studies.
During spring 2020, the federal gov-
ernment stepped in. The government 
offered hundreds of millions of dollars 
to the companies making the vaccines. 
Normally, companies do not start stage 
III trials until they have very strong data 
from stage I and II. That is because stage 
III trials are very expensive. But govern-
ment money changed the equation: com-
panies could move on to stage III with 
more limited data, with no financial risk 
to themselves. 
The process combined stage II and 
stage III trials. That sometimes hap-
pens, but not always. In July 2020, both 
Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech started 
clinical trials. The trials included over 
30,000 participants for Moderna, over 
40,000 for Pfizer-BioNTech, half in 
the control group, half in the placebo 
group. In late November, Pfizer sub-
mitted results to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and Moderna 
did so shortly after. The FDA experts 
reviewed the data and found it to justify 
granting an Emergency Use Authorization 
(EUA). FDA then convened its external 
expert committee (the Vaccines and 
Related Biological Products Advisory 
Committee, VRBPAC), which in a 
lengthy public meeting reviewed the data 
and supported granting an EUA for both 
vaccines.
The data was extremely strong. Both 
mRNA vaccines were over 90% effec-
tive against symptomatic COVID-19—a 
very high rate of vaccine effectiveness. 
They were also both highly effective at 
preventing severe diseases. The FDA 
said it would want to see over 50% 
effectiveness to grant an EUA; these far 
exceeded it. There were also no safety 
signals in the trials: while large num-
bers of people who got the vaccines had 
temporary unpleasant side effects (a day 
of fever, fatigue, pains at the injection 
site), there were no indication of serious 
harms from the vaccines. 
The authorization was followed by 
additional review by the Centers for 
Disease Control’s (CDC) expert advisory 
committee (the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices), which recom-
mends vaccines for the appropriate pop-
ulations—and engages in another review 
of the data. The Committee includes 
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experts in relevant fields, as well as a 
consumer representative.
The clinical trials were as large or 
larger than those for routine vaccines, 
and the data were stronger than is the 
case for most vaccines. The EUA had 
a very strong basis behind it, as strong 
as many licenses, even if the duration 
of time for which data had been avail-
able was shorter. There remained open 
questions: would the vaccines prevent 
infection? How long would immunity 
last? But the bottom line is still that the 
vaccines went through large clinical trials, 
were presented to the FDA with very 
strong data behind them, and earned 
the authorization. A second review was 
undertaken by a separate independent 
expert committee, which confirmed the 
result.
Post Marketing Approval
Vaccine monitoring continues after a 
vaccine is licensed, even in routine times, 
and the CDC prepared to provide addi-
tional monitoring to the usual systems 
for COVID-19 vaccines. The reason for 
that is that clinical trials are too small 
to identify a very rare side effect. Even 
large clinical trials that consist of tens of 
thousands of people would not catch a 
one in a hundred thousand or one in a 
million side effect. But we want to know 
of such a risk. Among other things, it may 
mean that some populations should not 
be vaccinated—if a type of individual 
is at higher risk, that individual may be 
protected by herd immunity. Second, it 
can help doctors and vaccinators iden-
tify a problem after a vaccine and treat 
it appropriately, reducing or preventing 
harm. For example, knowing that mRNA 
vaccines have a higher rate of allergic 
reactions among people with previous 
allergies to certain things led to those 
people being asked to wait 30 minutes 
at a vaccination site rather than 15, so 
they can be treated if a reaction occurs. 
Even in regular times, four monitor-
ing systems exist to cover vaccine safety.5 
The first is the Vaccine Adverse Events 
Reporting System (VAERS), which is 
a passive reporting system to which 
anyone can submit a report of some-
thing that happened after a vaccine. By 
its nature, VAERS accepts any report; 
so the existence of a report does not 
confirm the veracity of an event—and 
certainly does not prove a link to the 
vaccine. In spite of that, anti-vaccine 
activists have been misusing VAERS 
reports to try and create fear and doubt 
about COVID-19 vaccines—whether 
by pointing to the number of unverified 
reports as if it shows the risks of the vac-
cines, or by taking individual reports and 
presenting them as fact and as evidence 
of vaccine harm—a highly problematic 
practice, given the unverified nature of 
these reports.6 VAERS have an impor-
tant role to play in catching safety sig-
nals. Reports can lead to investigations 
that can show problems. But treating raw 
reports as evidence of vaccine harms is 
simply incorrect. 
A second monitoring system is the 
Vaccine Safety Datalink. This is a col-
laboration between the CDC and health-
care organizations throughout the coun-
try, covering over nine million people. 
This is an active monitoring system: it 
uses computerized programs to actively 
look for signals, and allows researchers to 
conduct studies on questions that come 
up. A third, the Post-Licensure Rapid 
Immunization Safety Monitoring System 
(PRISM) is part of the FDA Sentinel 
system, a system for monitoring medical 
products by tracking health insurance 
claims, using a much larger database 
and also actively monitoring. Fourth 
is the Clinical Immunization Safety 
Assessment Project (CISA), where pro-
viders can ask questions about unusual 
cases, including whether something is a 
contraindication, or whether a medical 
problem may be vaccine related. The 
CISA project also conducts research on 
specific issues and special populations 
(like HIV patients). 
In addition to these systems, in prep-
aration for the COVID-19 vaccines 
rollout, the CDC set out the Vaccine 
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Safety Assessment for Essential Workers, 
V-SAFE. Under the program, people 
sign up with their cellphone number 
after being vaccinated, and receive a 
text from CDC with a link to fill a short 
health report—daily for the first week, 
weekly afterwards for six weeks. If a 
problem is found, the program involves 
providing assistance to the recipient to 
file a VAERS report. 
At every meeting of the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices 
(ACIP) since the beginning of the vac-
cines’ rollout, CDC officials present a 
detailed description of the safety data. 
Multiple studies have also looked at 
specific safety issues, like the safety of 
the vaccines in pregnancy, at this point.
An example of how these systems work 
is the recent discussion of rare blood 
clots after the J&J vaccine. During the 
early months of 2021, reports in Europe 
pointed to rare blood clots happening 
after the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vac-
cine. That vaccine was not yet autho-
rized in the United States. But in early 
April, United States agencies took note 
of six cases of a rare type of blood 
clot—cerebral venous sinus thrombosis 
(CVST)—reported to VAERS among 
the 6.8 million doses of J&J vaccines 
distributed at that point. The reaction 
was immediate. On April 13, 2021, CDC 
and FDA issued a joint statement paus-
ing administration of the J&J vaccine 
“out of an abundance of caution.”7 The 
concern was not just that there might be 
a link between the vaccine and a rare 
and serious disorder (two of the people 
involved were hospitalized, and one 
died), but that the treatment needed to 
be different than the usual treatment of 
blood clots (administering heparin, an 
anticoagulant drug usually used for clots, 
could, in these cases, make things worse). 
The CDC convened ACIP on April 
14, 2021, and the committee met for five 
hours to look at the different cases and 
consider them. ACIP concluded that it 
did not have enough data, and, therefore, 
did not lift the pause. The decision (like 
the earlier decision to declare a pause) 
was controversial. Some experts pointed 
out that in the context of the pandemic, 
pausing the distribution of a vaccine (the 
only vaccine we have that is one dose 
and does not require high levels of cold 
storage) costs lives, and that even if there 
is a causal link, the events are very rare. 
Others emphasized the need to be espe-
cially cautious with COVID-19 vaccines, 
since people are watching them closely 
and trust in them is crucial to reaching 
sufficient uptake in a pandemic. ACIP 
met again on April 23, 2021, and after 
over six hours of discussion decided to 
lift the pause, concluding, by majority 
vote, that the benefits outweighed the 
risk. The four dissenters agreed that the 
vaccine should be unpaused, but would 
have sent a clearer message to providers 
and more information to recipients on 
the risk. While the risks may not be as 
rare as one in a million (there is a chance 
the reports did not capture all the events), 
they do appear, at this point, to be very 
rare.8 There may also be a causal con-
nection.
This event teaches us several lessons. 
First, it teaches us that the systems we 
have have the ability to detect events 
when the signal is as rare as one per 
million. Second, it teaches us that when 
a signal is detected, it is taken seriously—
and regulators react (and according to 
some observers, overreact). Third, it 
teaches us that such events are publicly 
and transparently discussed. While we 
may be tempted to think this is unique 
to the charged context of COVID-19, 
when an early rotavirus vaccine was 
taken off the market because of a seri-
ous side effect in one per ten thousand 
babies, that, too, received media atten-
tion.9
The takeaway is that we have very 
robust systems to oversee vaccine safety, 
and they have the capacity to identify 
even rare problems. Vaccine safety is 
taken seriously by regulators and observ-
ers, and the process to address problems 
is transparent, deliberative (though not 
necessarily fast), and in-depth.
This combination is what makes vac-
cines in the United States so safe, with 
such low risks. 
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